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Humans excel at recognizing (or inferring) another’s distal intentions, and recent
experiments suggest that this may be possible using only subtle kinematic cues elicited
during early phases of movement. Still, the cognitive and computational mechanisms
underlying the recognition of intentional (sequential) actions are incompletely known and
it is unclear whether kinematic cues alone are sufficient for this task, or if it instead
requires additional mechanisms (e.g., prior information) that may be more difficult to fully
characterize in empirical studies. Here we present a computationally-guided analysis of
the execution and recognition of intentional actions that is rooted in theories of motor
control and the coarticulation of sequential actions. In our simulations, when a performer
agent coarticulates two successive actions in an action sequence (e.g., “reach-to-grasp”
a bottle and “grasp-to-pour”), he automatically produces kinematic cues that an observer
agent can reliably use to recognize the performer’s intention early on, during the execution
of the first part of the sequence. This analysis lends computational-level support for the
idea that kinematic cues may be sufficiently informative for early intention recognition.
Furthermore, it suggests that the social benefits of coarticulation may be a byproduct
of a fundamental imperative to optimize sequential actions. Finally, we discuss possible
ways a performer agent may combine automatic (coarticulation) and strategic (signaling)
ways to facilitate, or hinder, an observer’s action recognition processes.
Keywords: coarticulation, joint action, action recognition, planning, distal actions, sequential action
1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a football player who is approaching the opponent team’s area with the ball. One can define
the player’s current goal as approaching the area, while his distal intention is passing the ball or
shooting. For both his teammates and his opponents, inferring the player’s distal intention (not only
his current goal) offers an advance opportunity to help or hinder him, highlighting the importance
of goal and intention recognition in realistic social interactions, cooperative or competitive. From
a computational perspective, another’s proximal goals and distal intentions can be considered
hidden (i.e., non-observable) cognitive variables that can be inferred based on observables (e.g., the
player’s behavior) and prior knowledge (e.g., tactics used by the soccer team) (Wolpert et al., 2003).
While generally difficult in real-world social settings, goal and intention recognition may be less
formidable than commonly believed, because proximal kinematics turn out to be very informative.
A series of studies have shown that humans are surprisingly good at inferring another person’s
proximal goals or distal intentions, even with apparently little data (Sartori et al., 2009). One
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recent study reveals that participants who observed grasping
movements were able to report accurately whether the to-be-
grasped object was small or big as early as 80 ms after movement
onset, suggesting that action kinematics can be very informative
at early perceptual stages (Ansuini et al., 2016). A similar
case may be made for the recognition of distal intentions. For
example, considering the case in which an agent makes a decision
between “grasping a bottle to pour water” vs. “to move the bottle,”
evidence shows that the agent’s decision is already discriminable
by the first part of the motor action, i.e., the grasping of the
bottle (Sartori et al., 2011). In fact, the way in which the bottle
is grasped turns out to be slightly different (e.g., at the level
of action kinematics) in the two cases. More in general, many
studies show a “tendency to grasp objects differently depending
on what one plans to do with the objects” (Rosenbaum et al.,
2012), which means that hand preshape can be used as a cue
to infer the distal intention. This situation has equivalents in
other domains, such as for example linguistics, in which it is
widely known that the pronunciation of segments depends on
other segments which are close to them, e.g., the next segment
(coarticulation, see e.g., Fowler, 1980; Fowler and Saltzman, 1993;
Mahr et al., 2015). These subtle changes in the action kinematics
provide information about the performer’s goals (Sartori et al.,
2009; Neal and Kilner, 2010; Manera et al., 2011; Becchio et al.,
2012; Naish et al., 2013; Quesque et al., 2013; Ansuini et al., 2015;
Lewkowicz et al., 2015; Cavallo et al., 2016). At least in some
cases, even subtle cues are detectable and can help observers to
infer the performer’s distal intentions early on, thus resulting in
communicative and not only pragmatic effects.
The informativeness of early kinematic cues may even
increase in explicitly cooperative social settings. For example,
one study reveals that during the same motor action of placing
an object, the deceleration phase was found to be slower
when a “giving” action (proximal goal) was directed to another
individual than when it was performed without this social
constrain (Becchio et al., 2008). A series of other studies have
shown that, when engaged in social interactions, co-actors
usually signal their intentions and carve their action kinematics
in ways that make their action goals easier to discriminate, when
there is asymmetric information and the performer agent is more
knowledgeable than the observer about the task at hand (Vesper
et al., 2010; Pezzulo, 2011; Pezzulo and Dindo, 2013; Pezzulo
et al., 2013a; Sacheli et al., 2013; Candidi et al., 2015).
These and other studies have assessed the usefulness of (early)
kinematic cues for understanding an actor’s proximal goals but
also his distal intentions. One possible explanation for this
phenomenon is that, in the context of grasping actions, an
object can be handled and manipulated differently depending
on a performer’s intention—hence the agent’s intention can be
inferred from the way the agent performs the motor action. This
explanation, however, lacks a quantitative (or computational)
characterization so far and it is unclear whether one can derive
the benefits of distal intention recognition from normative
principles, e.g., the minimization of action costs. Furthermore,
it is unclear if the explanation is sufficient to explain the data; for
example, if appealing to early kinematic cues can fully explain
the rapidity of intention recognition found in human studies, or
if it is instead necessary to appeal to additional mechanisms (e.g.,
sophisticated prior information or evolutionary adaptations for
intention recognition that are fundamentally different from those
that permit recognizing proximal action goals).
In this paper, we offer a computationally-guided explanation
of distal intention recognition that is rooted in normative
theories of computational motor control and (embodied)
sequential action (Sandamirskaya and Schöner, 2010;
Rosenbaum et al., 2012; Pezzulo et al., 2014, 2017; Lepora
and Pezzulo, 2015; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016). In a control
theoretic perspective, proximal actions have to simultaneously
fulfill the concurrent demands of proximal and distal goals
(or first-order and higher-order planning). In other words,
any goal-directed action is shaped according to its proximal
and distal goals: first-order planning (associated with proximal
goals) determines object handling grasp trajectory according
to immediate task demands (e.g., tuning to the orientation or
the grip size for an object to be grasped); higher-order planning
(associated with distal goals) alters one’s object manipulation
behavior not only on the basis of immediate task demands
but also on the basis of the next tasks to be performed. This
would imply that in certain conditions one can impose a cost
on the proximal action or execute it suboptimally in order to
fulfill the requirements of a distal action, e.g., a waiter can grasp
a glass with a thumb-down posture if he has to successively
turn it upright (Rosenbaum et al., 1990). The necessity of
simultaneously optimizing proximal and distal components of
an action sequence (e.g., “reaching and grasping a bottle to pour
water” vs. “to move the bottle”) implies the coarticulation of
consecutive motor acts, which would thus provide a normative
rationale for the differences in the former part of the sequence
(“reaching and grasping the bottle”) depending on the latter part
or distal intention1.
Below we present a computational analysis of coarticulation
during object grasping showing that (i) an agent who
coarticulates proximal and distal actions produces different
kinematic patterns in the first part of a sequential action
(“reaching and grasping the bottle”) depending on his distal goal
(“pouring” or “moving the bottle”); (ii) in turn, coarticulation
gives rise to kinematic features that are sufficient for observers to
correctly discriminate the agent’s distal intention early in time—
at least in some cases. Our analysis provides computational-level
support for the idea that accurate intention recognition may be
due to early kinematic cues elicited during proximal actions,
without necessarily requiring additional mechanisms. In turn,
the elicitation of informative cues may be a byproduct of the
optimization of sequential actions and does not need to have
necessarily a social goal (e.g., facilitation of action recognition,
like in signaling Vesper et al., 2010; Pezzulo, 2011; Sacheli
et al., 2013)—although of course automatic (coarticulation) and
1For the sake of simplicity, here we equate coarticulation and assimilation, see
also (Jerde et al., 2003). However, there is a conceptual difference between
the two: coarticulation is the underlying process (i.e., the temporal overlap
between sequential actions) while assimilation is the superficial result (in terms
of increasing the similarity of the last part of the first movement to the first part of
the last movement).
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strategic (signaling) modulations of one’s own action kinematics
can be merged.
2. COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH
In computational motor control, it is widely assumed that
action representations stem from (probabilistic) internal models
(Wolpert et al., 2003; Jeannerod, 2006; Shadmehr and Krakauer,
2008; Friston et al., 2010, 2017; Pezzulo et al., 2015, in press;
Donnarumma et al., 2016; Maisto et al., 2016; Stoianov et al.,
2016). These models can be hierarchical, with higher hierarchical
levels encoding more abstract and distal aspects and lower
hierarchical levels encoding more proximal aspects that are
related to action performance. At lower levels, actions such
as grasping or pouring can be associated with probability
distributions over hand kinematics (e.g., controls of angles of
fingers), which of course change over time as the action unfolds.
Within this general probabilistic framework, we model the
performer agent using a computational method that combines
basic actions (or motor primitives) such as grasping and pouring
to realize a sequential action (e.g., grasp a bottle to move it or
pour), with or without coarticulating them. Furthermore, we
model the observer agent using a computational method that
infers the performer agent’s current action, by “simulating” the
execution of (the same) motor primitives for grasping, moving
and pouring. Belowwe briefly introduce these two computational
models, which we successively specify more formally.
2.1. Rationale of the Computational
Approach
2.1.1. Performer Agent
According to our coarticulation hypothesis, we describe
the planning of sequential actions as the coarticulation
(or assimilation) of two successive motor primitives, e.g.,
motor primitive for reaching-and-grasping and one for
grasping-and-pouring. Intuitively, assimilation implies that
if the two sequential actions are modeled by two different
probability distributions of hand kinematics (Dindo et al.,
2011; Pezzulo et al., 2013a), these two distributions are made
more similar by sampling from their probabilistic superposition
(aka, coarticulated distribution) rather than the two original
distributions, over time. Figure 1 offers a schematic illustration
of this concept in a simplified 2D domain, where the proximal
action (from time zero to time 1,000) corresponds to moving
a mouse to the center-right, and the distal action (from time
1,000 to time 2,000) corresponds to moving the mouse to the
top-right or bottom-right. The colors correspond to the mean
and variance of the probability distributions of hypothetical
center-right, top-right and bottom-right mouse movements.
The figure shows how the same proximal action—move to
center-right—can be either independent from (top panel) or
assimilated/coarticulated with (bottom panel) the successive
action of reaching the top-right or bottom-right. In the latter
case, the effects of assimilation on the mouse movements are
apparent from time 600, well before the (theoretical) beginning
of the distal action.
2.1.2. Observer Agent
According to motor theories of cognition, the computational
mechanisms (and internal models) used for action planning
and execution are also reused for action understanding, using
motor simulation (Jeannerod, 2006). In keeping with this idea,
we model the action observation process as a (probabilistic)
inference problem, in which an observer agent considers multiple
possible hypotheses that correspond to the actions that may
have generated the observed sensory stimuli (i.e., whether the
performer agent is grasping for pouring vs. grasping for moving)
and has to select one of them. To do so, the observer agent
simulates executing multiple actions in parallel (from his own
motor repertoire), compares the predictions under these different
hypotheses with the observed movements, and assigns high
probability to the action/hypothesis that generates the smaller
prediction error. This process is iterated over time using a
probabilistic scheme (see below), so that as the performer
agent’s actions unfold in time, evidence accumulates for one
of the alternative hypotheses. Note that using this framework
implicitly requires the assumption that performer and observer
agents share the same set of motor primitives, although the
probabilistic parameters might differ according to individual
actor’s knowledge and expertise. Our simulations will show
that this motor simulation process converges more readily
to the correct explanation when the performer agent uses
coarticulation—and in this latter case, an observer agent can
correctly recognize the distal intention of a demonstrating agent
while he is still executing the proximal action.
2.2. Formal Aspects of the Computational
Approach
2.2.1. Performer Agent and the Coarticulation
Distribution
Coarticulation is the process of altering one’s own behavior to
facilitate the next action. In this framework, a proximal action is
coarticulated (or assimilated) with the next action in a sequence
if the differences between the (probability distributions denoting
the) two actions are minimized, while at the same time it
maintains its correct pragmatics (e.g., a reaching action has to
effectively reach the bottle despite being coarticulated with a
successive grasping action).
To exemplify this concept, let’s consider two actions
(e.g., reaching a bottle and executing a power grasp), each
implemented as a motor primitive (m1 or m2) that, for every
moment in time, can be associated to a probability distribution
(for example, a Gaussian distribution over its corresponding
kinematic parameters such as hand and finger configurations).
Figure 2 shows the distributions associated to the two motor
primitives, p(xt|m1) for model m1 (e.g., reaching the bottle, in
blue) and p(xt|m2) for model m2 (e.g., power grasp, in red), at
time t. Based on these two original distributions, it is possible
to compute the novel coarticulated distribution pcoa(xt|m1) (e.g.,
reaching the bottle while preparing to grasp it with a power grasp,
in orange), which corresponds to the fact that at time t, the motor
primitive m1 is coarticulated with m2. Obviously, this example
only describes what happens in a single temporal instant, while
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FIGURE 1 | Original (Top) vs. Coarticulated (Bottom) distributions for a simplified action sequence (e.g., mouse movement). The sequence consists of two parts:
moving to the center-right (from zero to 1,000 ms) and moving to the top-right or bottom-right (from 1,000 to 1,500ms); see main text for explanation. The colors
denote the probability of occupying a given position in space, during time, from red (highest probability) to blue (lowest probability).
actions unfold in time. To model temporal dynamics of motor
primitives, it is possible to extend the same formalism using
continuous distributions, see below.
It is important to remark that any sample drawn from
the coarticulation distribution (in orange) at time t should
simultaneously satisfy two constraints: it should be representative
of the original distribution of the first motor primitive p(xt|m1)
while at the same time should have a high probability of
belonging to the second motor primitive m2 (or in more general
cases, even to a set of future motor primitives, mj). In keeping,
to obtain an approximation of the coarticulation distribution,
we adopt a rejection sampling technique. Let xˆt be a sample
from the original distribution p(xt|mi) or a motor primitive mi.
Given K random values, uk ∈ [0, 1], sampled from the uniform
distribution over [0, p(xt|mk)/p
max
k
], we decide to accept the
sample xˆt if the following holds:
ui < wi · p(xˆt|mi) and uj < wj · p(xˆt|mj),∀j 6= i (1)
where w = [w1,w2, . . . ,wK] is a vector of weights that modulate
the contribution of the individual motor primitives in the
coarticulation distribution. Intuitively, this implies that a sample
is accepted if and only if it is a “good exemplar” of both (say)
the grasping and the pouring distributions—implying that the
novel coarticulation distribution combines aspects of grasping
and pouring.
In the case of continuous distributions p(xt|mj), the
coarticulation distribution becomes:
pcoa(xt|mi;w) ∝ wi · p(xt|mi)
∏
j 6=i
(wj · p(xt|mj)) (2)
The resulting coarticulation distribution pcoa(xt|mi) is
constructed in such a way that its kinematic parameters are
the most probable for the motor primitive mi but also the most
similar to those of the primitive(s) to be executed next (mj). As
illustrated in Figure 1, the motor primitives for (say) grasping
and pouring then mesh coherently over time (bottom panel:
coarticulation), rather than being simply executed one after the
other (top panel: no coarticulation). Another way to appreciate
the key features of the coarticulation distribution is contrasting
it with its “converse”: the signaling distribution, see Figure 2.
While the coarticulation distribution is constructed in such a way
to emphasize the similarities between two motor primitives, the
signaling distribution is constructed in such a way to emphasize
their differences—hence the former (coarticulation) distribution
is more appropriate to model assimilation effects (e.g., between
two consecutive motor primitives as in our examples) and the
latter (signaling) distribution is more appropriate to model
dissimilation effects such as those arising during non-verbal,
sensorimotor communication (Vesper et al., 2010; Pezzulo, 2011;
Pezzulo and Dindo, 2013; Pezzulo et al., 2013a,b; Sacheli et al.,
2013; Candidi et al., 2015). See the Appendix for a more formal
treatment of the signaling distribution.
2.2.2. Observer Agent and Probabilistic Motor
Simulation
Our implementation of action understanding via motor
simulation is based on a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN)
shown in Figure 3. DBNs are Bayesian networks representing
temporal probability models in which directed arrows
depict assumptions of conditional (in)dependence between
variables (circles) (Murphy, 2002). Shaded nodes represent
observed variables while the others are hidden and need to be
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of original, coarticulation and signaling distributions. The original (Gaussian) distributions (at time t) corresponding to two motor
primitives: p(xt|m1) for motor primitive m1 (blue) and p(xt|m2) for motor primitive m2 (red). In the coarticulation distribution p
coa(xt|m1) (orange), the motor primitive m1
is coarticulated (or assimilated, i.e., made as similar as possible) with the motor primitive m2 using Equation (2)—where m1 and m2 may correspond, for example, to
the first and second action in a sequence. In the signaling distribution psig(xt|m1) (green), the motor primitive m1 is dissimilated (i.e., made as different as possible)
from the motor primitive m2. See the main text for explanation.
estimated through the process of probabilistic inference. In our
representation, the process of action understanding is influenced
by the following factors expressed as stochastic variables in the
model (see Dindo et al., 2011 for a more detailed account of the
model):
1. c: discrete context variable;
2. i: index of the agent’s own repertoire of goal-directed actions
(proximal or distal): each action directly influences the
activation of related forward and inversemodels;
3. u: control-related continuous variable (e.g., forces,
velocities, . . . );
4. x: state (e.g., the position of the demonstrator’s end-effector in
an allocentric reference frame);
5. z: observation, a perceptual measurement related to the state
(e.g., the perceived position of the demonstrator’s end-effector
on the retina).
During action observation, the model has to infer which action
the performer agent is performing (e.g., whether he or she
is currently grasping, pouring, lifting, etc.—where each action,
proximal or distal, is denoted by an index it). The goal-directed
action is considered to be hidden (i.e., not directly observable);
but it can be inferred on the basis of noisy sensory observations
(denoted as zt), e.g., the performer’s hand movements. The logic
is the usual of (inverse) Bayesian inference, which considers
multiple potential actions as candidate explanations, which
compete to explain the sensory data (Wolpert et al., 2003; Demiris
and Khadhouri, 2005; Dindo et al., 2011; Friston et al., 2011;
Pezzulo, 2013; Donnarumma et al., in press). Each action it is
associated with a paired inverse-forward model (see Equation
4 below). Re-enacting these actions “in simulation” generates
a motor control ut (given the hidden state xt−1, aka inverse
model), and a prediction of the next hidden state xt (given the
motor control ut and the previous state xt−1, aka forwardmodel).
Comparing the predicted and sensed movements under various
competing hypotheses (e.g., grasping, pouring) permits to assess
which one generates less prediction error, hence explaining
better the data. A priori contextual information ct can bias the
inferential process and the initial choice of the internal models to
test (in case they are too numerous).
The following equations describe the observation model
(Equation 3), which specifies the way (noisy) sensory stimuli
are used to estimate the state of the demonstrator (e.g., hand
position); the transition model (Equation 4), which specifies how
the state of the demonstrator evolves as a function of his or her
goals and motor commands; and the a priori distribution over
the set of hidden variables (Equation 5), which represents the
perceiver’s prior belief and is a necessary ingredient of Bayesian
systems.
p(Zt|Xt) = p(zt|xt) (3)
p(Xt|Xt−1) = p(xt|xt−1, ut , i) · p(ut|xt−1, i) (4)
p(X0) = p(x0) · p(c0) · p(i|c0) (5)
The inference exploits the usual (prediction) error-correction
mechanisms of Bayesian systems. The model starts with prior
hypotheses about the demonstrator’s actions and intentions,
and these are iteratively revised as new sensory evidence is
sampled. The evidence provided by the perceptual process
and the observed states (zt) is responsible for “correcting” the
posterior distribution when integrating the observation model
p(zt|xt). In other words, those parts of the hidden state that are
in accordance with the observations will exhibit peaks in the
posterior distribution. Since those states have been produced by
a goal-directed motor primitive, the marginalization of the final
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FIGURE 3 | Graphical model (DBN) for action simulation based on coupled forward-inverse models. See main text and Dindo et al. (2011) for details.
posterior distribution produces the required discrete distribution
over motor primitives, p(it|z1:t).
Thus, the motor primitive with the highest probability
(above a fixed threshold) is selected as the “winning” primitive;
such an inference process can be iterated over time by using
the full posterior distribution as the prior for the next step,
until convergence. Ultimately, the aim of the whole process
is estimating the probability of each model given the current
observations so far (i.e., likelihood). The most plausible model
is the one that maximizes the posterior probability of the model.
As usual in a Bayesian setting, the whole process is influenced
by the choice of the prior distributions for the available motor
primitives: the more likely is a particular motor primitive a-
priori, the more reliable and fast its recognition. In particular,
using this framework action recognition is influenced by an
auxiliary (contextual) variable, which can intuitively reflect an
agent’s contextual knowledge (e.g., that pouring is highly unlikely
if the bottle is almost empty) that biases the motor primitives that
are actually simulated by the agent. While prior probabilities and
contextual information are important in real-life scenarios, we do
not use them in our simulations.
3. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
We performed a series of computational simulations, in which
one (performer) agent executes one of two sequential actions
(e.g., “reaching and grasping a bottle to pour water” vs.
“reaching and grasping a bottle to move it”) in two conditions:
with and without the coarticulation method explained in
Section 2.2.1. At the same time, the other (observer) agent has
to disambiguate these two alternatives as soon and as accurately
as possible, using the probabilistic motor simulation methods
introduced in Section 2.2.2. These simulations permit us to
study the benefits of coarticulation, and to test the “sufficiency”
hypothesis introduced earlier: namely, that kinematic features
at early stages of a coarticulated action permit an observer
to recognize the action. In our scenario, this means that a
sequential action (e.g., “reaching and grasping a bottle to pour
water”) can be discriminated already during the first (reaching)
phase. Conversely, when the same action is executed without
coarticulation, it can only be recognized during the second phase,
after the agent has grasped the bottle.
In our simulations, for the sake of simplicity we focused on
two two-step sequential actions: reach-and-pour vs. reach-and-
move. In practice, we used three motor primitives: the former
primitive (reach-to-grasp) corresponds to the first step in both
sequences, while the other two primitives (grasp-to-pour and
grasp-to-move) correspond to the two final actions to complete
the first and second sequential actions, respectively. At each
moment in time, from 0 ms (beginning of sequential action)
to 1,500 ms (end of sequential action), each motor primitive
corresponds to a probability distribution over controls of finger,
thumb and wrist of a (human) hand.
The motor primitives were derived based on controls and
parameters extracted from human data collected from six adult
male participants. Each participant executed every primitive
action 50 times, and data on angles of finger, thumb and wrist
were collected using a dataglove (HumanGlove - Humanware
S.r.l., Pontedera, Pisa, Italy) endowedwith 16 sensors. The former
(reach-to-grasp) motor primitive was acquired while participants
reached an object the size of a bottle with a concave constriction
(see also Sartori et al., 2011), with no knowledge of the next action
to perform with it. We selected the latter two primitives (grasp-
to-pour and grasp-to-move) as instances of power grasp and a
precision grip actions, respectively, in which the end-position of
the fingers was analogous to the positions reported by Sartori
et al. (2011) while humans grasped a bottle to pour or move it,
respectively.
The internal dynamical models (motor primitives) used in
the simulations were obtained by regressing the aforementioned
data (50 trials for 6 participants for each primitive), to obtain
probability distributions over angles of finger, thumb and wrist,
over time. For each motor primitive, we used an Echo State
Gaussian Process (ESGP) (Chatzis and Demiris, 2011), a method
for the Bayesian modeling of sequential data that produces
a measure of confidence (or uncertainty) on the generated
predictions (the model predictive density), which can be directly
used within our computational approach.
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In the simulations reported below, a non-coarticulated action
corresponds to the first primitive (reach-to-grasp) being used for
the first 1,000 ms, while one of the two remaining primitives
(grasp-to-pour or grasp-to-move, depending on the task) is used
for the successive 500 ms. A coarticulated action corresponds
to the first primitive (reach-to-grasp) being coarticulated with
one of the two remaining primitives (grasp-to-pour or grasp-
to-move, depending on the task) during the interval between
500 and 1,000 ms, using the coarticulation method explained in
Section 2.2.1. In other words, we derive the coarticulated actions
by “meshing” two primitives, not by using separate ESGPs. Note
that in the simulations, we coarticulated the index finger and
thumb controls (not the wrist controls), coherent with their
importance in grasping and pouring actions (Sartori et al., 2011).
A first result of our simulations is that during the execution
of the former (reach-to-grasp) motor primitive in the sequence,
Maximum Grip Aperture and Time of Maximum Grip Aperture
differ significantly if the primitive is coarticulated with a grasp-
to-pour primitive, with a grasp-to-move primitive, or not
coarticulated at all, see Figure 4. This result is not remarkable
per se, but can be considered as a “safety check” that the different
intention elicits different action kinematics, with a pattern that is
qualitatively coherent with the results of Sartori et al. (2011) in
a similar scenario. What is more important for us was studying
whether (and how) this difference in action kinematics translates
into an advantage for the observer agent, at early stages of the
performer’s agent movement.
To answer this question, we simulated the behavior of an
observer agent that has to recognize the actions performed by
the performer agent, using the probabilistic motor simulation
mechanism described in Section 2.2.2. As shown in Figure 5,
the observer agent had a clear advantage in recognizing the
performed action when it was coarticulated. More specifically,
the figure shows that without coarticulation the performer agent’s
distal intention (pouring or moving the bottle) can be recognized
only after he reaches the bottle (i.e., after time 1,000), while
with coarticulation it can be recognized much earlier, during
the execution of the first motor primitive (i.e., well before time
1,000). This latter result illustrates that coarticulation affords
intention recognition in ways that are qualitatively different from
the mere execution of a (non-informed) action.
4. DISCUSSION
Humans excel at recognizing distal intentions on the basis
of (apparently) little information, but the cognitive and
computational mechanisms underlying this ability are
incompletely known. We have proposed that normative
principles regulating the coarticulation of sequential actions can
explain how it is possible to infer a performer’s distal intention
by looking at the kinematics of his proximal actions.
To test this idea, we implemented a series of simulations in
which the performer agent executes sequential actions (reach-
and-pour or reach-and-move) as sequences of two primitives
(reach-to-grasp and grasp-to-pour, or reach-to-grasp and grasp-
to-move) with or without coarticulation. Our results show that
two successive actions can be coarticulated (or assimilated) in
such a way that the kinematics of the proximal action are
adequate for (and informative of) the next action(s) in the
sequence. Indeed, our results show that, first, coarticulated
actions have characteristic kinematic features compared to non-
coarticulated actions, and second, that these features may be
sufficient for an observer agent to correctly recognize the
performer’s agent distal intention early on. This result holds
despite the fact that we used simplified motor primitives and
only coarticulated index finger and thumb controls. In principle,
an observer agent having access to richer visual stimuli and
more sophisticated primitives (with more controls and degrees
of freedom) may enjoy additional benefits; it is however possible
that coarticulation only operates on a restricted set of degrees
of freedom, e.g., those that are necessary to solve the task, as
for the uncontrolled manifold hypothesis (Scholz and Schöner,
1999). At the same time, it is possible that in real-life conditions,
some information encoded in movement kinematics that would
be potentially useful to infer a performer’s intention may
nevertheless remain invisible to observers—for example, when
parametric variations are too small to be detected (Naish et al.,
2013; Cavallo et al., 2016). Our computational study shows
that coarticulation promotes the appropriate preconditions for
advance intention understanding, but the additional factors that
may favor (or prevent) an advantage for observer agents remain
to be fully assessed.
Our emphasis on the sufficiency of kinematic cues to solve
intention recognition tasks does not imply that interactive
agents do not use other sources of information, such as (prior
information on) the context in which the action takes place. For
example, it has been argued that the same action (approaching a
person with a knife) can be motivated by two different intentions
(e.g., Dr. Jekyll who wants to cure or Mr. Hyde who wants to
kill) and these can be disambiguated based on the place where
the action occurs (operating room or dark street) (Kilner et al.,
2007), but see Jacob and Jeannerod (2005); Kilner et al. (2007);
Becchio et al. (2008) for alternative proposals. This kind of prior
information can be readily incorporated in the action recognition
scheme described above, through the contextual (C) node of the
DBN. By considering the probabilistic relations between contexts
and actions, it would be possible to bias the action recognition
process and distinguish the intentions motivating two actions,
even when they are kinematically identical—a situation that, as
we have discussed, may be more the exception than the rule.
Furthermore, it would be possible to extend the model discussed
here so that it also directs saccadic eye movements to the most
informative parts of the demonstrator’s actions, in keeping with
the idea that action recognition uses an active sensing scheme
(Donnarumma et al., in press). Modeling eye movements would
help understanding under which conditions subtle kinematic
cues that are embedded in goal-directed actions are detected by
observer agents.
Following a motor cognition approach, our model
implements action recognition as a (Bayesian) inferential
process that uses the logic of “analysis-by-synthesis” or action
simulation (Jeannerod, 2006). This is in keeping with evidence
(reviewed in Grafton, 2009) that observer agents simulate the
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FIGURE 4 | Maximum Grip Aperture and Time of Maximum Grip Aperture when (1) the reach-to-grasp primitive is coarticulated with grasp-to-pour, (2)
the reach-to-grasp primitive is coarticulated with grasp-to-move and (3) the reach-to-grasp primitive is not coarticulated (baseline condition), as if
there was no successive action.
FIGURE 5 | Probability assigned by the observer agent to the to-be-recognized action (pouring or moving). The figures show the mean probability and
standard deviation (shaded area) of pouring vs. moving action sequences given the current observations. The vertical dotted bar is the moment when the performer
agent reaches the bottle. (Top) Probabilities over time when the to-be-recognized action is pouring. (Bottom) Probabilities over time when the to-be-recognized
action is moving. In both cases, if the action is not coarticulated, it is recognized only after the bottle is reached. Instead, if the action is coarticulated, it is recognized
early on, during the execution of the proximal action.
actions they observe in their brains. Alternative hypotheses
point, for example, to a more ecological or enactive view of
action understanding, which appeal to “direct perception” rather
than (Bayesian) inference (Gibson, 1966). While this alternative
perspective would differ from our implementation, the logic of
our argument here may be the same—that is, that coarticulation
generates information that an observer agent can use to form an
advance understanding of the performer’s goals (via Bayesian
inference or direct perception).
It is notable that we have illustrated the model by discussing
coarticulation in the domain of reaching and grasping actions,
where essentially coarticulation implies the preshaping of hands
before executing a grasping action (Jeannerod, 2006). However,
the phenomenon of coarticulation is evident in all sequential
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actions, and the model presented here is (in principle) general
enough to address analogous phenomena in other domains,
including speech, sign language (Jerde et al., 2003) and the
planning of smooth action sequences (Rosenbaum et al., 2006).
It remains to be assessed by future studies whether the
computational scheme presented here is empirically adequate
to explain sequential action in these and other domains, or if
it needs to be extended to include more sophisticated internal
generative models (e.g., of hierarchical dynamics rather than
only sequences of motor primitives Kiebel et al., 2008, 2009;
Donnarumma et al., 2015a,b)—as well as the relative merits of
alternative frameworks such as those stemming from a dynamical
systems perspective (Kelso, 1995; Marsh et al., 2006, 2009).
To sum up, according to this (normative) proposal, the main
goal of coarticulation is to optimize sequential actions, and the
facilitatory effects for social cognition are byproducts of this
process. In other words, according to this proposal, there is no
need of any action recognition or mindreading adaptation in
the observer, because the action recognition process is greatly
facilitated by the performer—albeit often unwittingly (but see the
Appendix). This process is effective because during the execution
of sequential actions, there is a sort of backward influence from
the latter action (and its constraints) to the former action. Thus,
the former action already includes subtle but reliable kinematic
cues, which can be used to infer the performer’s distal goal—and
we humans excel at picking up these cues.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Relations between Coarticulation (or
Assimilation) and Signaling (or
Dissimilating) during Social Interactions
While we have emphasized the automaticity of coarticulation, it
can also be used strategically in social contexts; for example, to
lower (or raise) the co-actor’s uncertainty about our plans—that
is, to help him or her understand an actor’s own distal intentions,
or to feint; or even (in principle) to smoothly combine one’s
own actions with those of co-actors (Gonzalez et al., 2011). To
illustrate how it is possible to use coarticulation strategically,
we denote with p(x|mi) the sequence of the states associated
to the motor primitive mi computed using the coarticulation
distribution p(xt|mi). If a performer agent wants to facilitate the
perceiver’s action recognition process, (s)he can compute the
weights wi(t) so that they minimize the following equation:
wi(t) = argminw(t)
[
KL
[
pcoai (w(t)), pi
]
+ λS
(
θ − psimulatedi
)]
(A1)
where:
• KL(·, ·) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the
coarticulation distribution with the set of weights w and the
distribution with no coarticulation;
• λ is the amount of coarticulation in the given action;
• psimulatedi is an estimation of the perceiving agent’s posterior
probability correctly recognizing the model mi (under the
assumption that performer and perceiver share the same set
of internal models);
• θ is the (experimental) threshold that the agent uses during
model recognition;
• S is the logistic function.
The KL term considers the cost of coarticulation, where cost can
be associated to biomechanical factors, effort, and other forms of
costs (e.g., cognitive costs associated to planning and executing
non-familiar or non-habitual movements). The λ term permits
modulation of the amount of coarticulation (λ = 0 means no
coarticulation). By minimizing the above quantity, the performer
agent essentially disambiguates the coarticulated action from
possible alternatives, thus permitting an observer agent to infer
his distal intention at early stages.
This latter example shows how it is possible to use
coarticulation to signal one’s own intentions (e.g., make
them “readable”), or conversely to feint another intention,
analogous to other sensorimotor communication dynamics
during social interactions (Vesper et al., 2010; Pezzulo, 2011;
Pezzulo and Dindo, 2013; Pezzulo et al., 2013a; Sacheli
et al., 2013; Candidi et al., 2015). Indeed, in our formulation
coarticulation and signaling are not just similar but stem
from a consistent computational approach. Indeed, the
distribution defined in Equation (2) is the dual of the signaling
distribution defined in Pezzulo et al. (2013a), and which
can be used to dissimilate between the current action having
been performed and alternative actions, with the aim to
facilitate the perceiver’s agent recognition of the proximal
goal.
Defining a function:
pcomm(xt|mi;w) ∝ wi · p(xt|mi)∏
k∈Dissim
(1− wk · p(xt|mk)/p
max
k ) ·
∏
j∈Assim
(wj · p(xt|mj)) (A2)
where pmax
k
is the maximum value for the distribution
p(xt|mk), Dissim is the set of motor models to be
dissimulated and Assim is the set of motor models to be
coarticulated.
In short, one can use the same equation to flexibly combine or
interleave assimilation and dissimilation of actions, see Figure 2.
As we have shown here, one can assimilate two consecutive
actions, and this would correspond to coarticulation. However,
one can also assimilate two simultaneous actions, and this would
correspond to a feint, in that it would render the observer’s action
recognition process more difficult. Finally, dissimilating one’s
current action from the alternatives would amount to signaling
(and helpful for the observer agent), while dissimilating two
consecutive actions in an action sequence would amount to
feinting own’s own distal intention. This equation can thus be
used to derive formal descriptions of various strategies to help
or hinder during social interactions, which can be helpful for
the (trial-by-trial, model-based) analysis of human data (Candidi
et al., 2015).
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